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The debate on fragile states has triggered an interest in how people organize for everyday 
security and for issues of common interest in the absence of a functioning state. Drawing on 
two extensive case studies from Somaliland/Puntland and Afghanistan, this report discusses 
how people, in contexts of post-conflict state fragility, rely on a range of local institutions and 
arrangements that are partly home-grown, and partly organized and supported by the central 
state.
The study explores how state and non-state institutions at the local level are ‘put to work’ 
to further human security. It asks how, in contexts of state fragility, state and non-state 
institutions help people cope with and reduce the multiple insecurities in their lives. Starting 
point for the study has been the insight that fragile states are not ungoverned spaces but 
instead feature forms of governance and of local ordering that emerge from within: the idea 
of ‘governance without government’ as developed by Menkhaus and others (e.g. Menkhaus 
2006). Following the literature on hybrid political orders and institutional multiplicity, 
the scope of non-state governance was defined in a broad way, to include customary 
forms of authority and social organisation, civil society, humanitarian organisations, rebel 
organisations or criminal groups, diaspora groups, and the private sector.
The central question for this study is: How do people interact with local governance institutions 
(state/non-state, formal/informal) to shape their human security? In order to understand 
how local institutions matter to human security in fragile settings, this research traced 
real responses of real institutions to real problems. The field studies started at people’s 
experienced key threats to their human security and then analysed the responses of different 
types of institutions to these.
The two field studies took place in regions affected by conflict-related state fragility in 
Somaliland/Puntland (Sanaag region) and Afghanistan (Kunduz and Takhar provinces). 
These regions have been located, geographically or politically, at the ‘fringes of the state’, 
where the presence of the central state was historically marginal. In these contexts, local 
societies have typically developed robust and elaborate institutions and arrangements to 
cater for local needs of order and public goods. The studies discuss what type of institutions 
are found at the local level in these regions and what  role they play in people’s search for 
everyday human security. The focus is on drought and violent inter-tribal conflict (in Sanaag), 
administration of justice (Takhar), and water distribution (Kunduz). 
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The state has a very limited reach
The studies in Somaliland/Puntland and Afghanistan brought out very clearly that the state 
had a very limited reach. State presence has been affected by violent conflict and on-going 
political contestation. Efforts at state building are on-going but, at the time of research, these 
had as yet done little to increase the presence or legitimacy of the state ‘on the ground’. 
The governance of everyday life in the regions studied relied to an important extent on well-
developed and firmly rooted customary and informal institutions. 
People rely on home-grown institutions to address their everyday 
human security needs
People rely on home-grown institutions to address their everyday human security needs 
related to livelihood stress, resource management and competition, and issues of order, 
security and conflict resolution. The type of non-state institutions that were found to be 
relevant primarily included customary authorities, community-level  mechanisms for 
consultation and decision making, and emergent arrangements for addressing specific 
needs. With this, the findings mostly confirm the existing knowledge on customary 
institutions in fragile states.
Home-grown institutions are viewed positively in the eyes of local 
populations
People perceived home-grown institutions as strong, effective and appropriate. However, 
this was not a given. The legitimacy of these institutions derived from their performance in 
terms of responding to locally identified needs, familiarity, the fact that they were guided by 
locally accepted values (including equity), and that there were possibilities for constituencies 
to steer and hold leadership accountable. When specific institutions no longer meet these 
expectations, they may enter into decline. People will then look for alternatives, either by 
seeking to change the existing institution or by turning to an alternative.
The state is both ‘absent’ and ‘present’ 
People mostly experienced the state as ‘missing’. Despite efforts at increasing state 
presence, the state was seen as distant and lacked the legitimacy of home-grown institutions. 
People had an idea of what a state would ideally provide for them, but experienced a state 
which in their daily lives, for all practical purposes, could not deliver. The state, however, was 
clearly present on people’s horizons and there were multiple references to the state as an 
idea, as the bigger whole of which people were part. Non-state institutions were depicted as 
‘nested’ within that bigger polity. In exceptional situations that transcended local response 
mechanisms, such as the severe drought discussed for Sanaag, state agencies were turned to 
and did engage with the problem. This was one of the most surprising findings of the study: 
though people’s everyday lives reflected a situation of “governance without government”, 
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they maintained an idea of the state as the ultimate fall-back option in responding to critical 
events. 
The institutional landscape in the studied regions is multiple and to 
some extent hybrid
Besides the variety of home-grown institutions and the institutions of the state, there 
were other sets of institutions: armed opposition groups (Afghanistan); and local and 
international civil society organisations (Somaliland/Puntland). The interaction between 
customary/home-grown institutions and state institutions could best be described as one of 
functional complementarity or perhaps pragmatic accommodation. In response to problems 
such as drought or the control of crime and violence, a concerted strategy was worked out 
which sought to build on the respective strengths. In these cases, the power of initiative 
rested to an important degree with the customary authorities.
Within these multiple institutional fields, non-state institutions change and adapt, in 
response to new challenges and the needs and strategies of local populations. This suggests 
indeed that the active pursuit of human security shapes both how institutions develop and 
how they relate to each other.
Implications for intervention
What can we learn from these studies to inform policy?
• The ambition to link with non-state institutions can be a fruitful entry point given the
strength and importance of these institutions in many contexts. This requires carefully
looking at ‘what is there’, both in terms of customary institutions and in terms of the role
of the state.
• There is no need to make an ‘either-or’ choice between non-state institutions and the
state: rather, take the existence of multiple institutions as a starting point and examine, for
a particular context, what works, who, and in what constellation with other institutions.
• Agencies may follow a similar methodology as this research followed: that is, to follow
where people go with their problems. The role of (international) NGOs could then
be to support these institutions or arrangements, institutional trajectories and multi-
institutional responses.
• Rights-based NGOs like Oxfam Novib can consider how customary or other non-state
institutions can be treated as ‘duty-bearers’ in the absence of a well-functioning state.
• A key challenge is to avoid undermining local institutions by supporting them financially
or through molding them too strictly to non-local criteria. Providing external resources to
locally legitimate institutions may compromise their local accountability. Rather, the way
forward would seem to be in a double strategy of engaging with duty bearers, and with





The debate on fragile states has triggered an interest in how people organize for everyday 
security and for issues of common interest in the absence of a functioning state. This report 
aims to contribute to that debate. Drawing on two extensive case studies, from Somaliland/
Puntland and Afghanistan, this report discusses how people, in contexts of post-conflict state 
fragility, rely on a range of local institutions and arrangements that are partly home-grown, 
and partly organized and supported by the central state.
This study explores how state and non-state institutions at the local level are ‘put to work’ 
to further human security. It asks how, in contexts of state fragility, state and non-state 
institutions  help people cope with and reduce the multiple insecurities in their lives. The 
study is inspired by the idea of ‘governance without government’ as developed by Menkhaus 
and others (e.g. Menkhaus 2006) in the framework of the fragile states debate. This notion 
highlighted the importance of home-grown, non-state institutional arrangements to cater for 
some of the functions that the ‘missing’ state cannot or does not fulfil.2
This report synthesizes the main findings of two field-based studies, in regions affected 
by conflict-related state fragility in Somaliland/Puntland (Sanaag region) and Afghanistan 
(Kunduz and Takhar provinces). These studies discuss what types of institutions are found 
at the local level and what  role they play in people’s search for everyday security. The focus 
is on drought and violent inter-tribal conflict (in Sanaag), and administration of justice 
(Takhar), and water distribution (Kunduz). Both studies show how non-state, customary 
institutions enter into a complex interplay with state institutions.
The research was commissioned by Oxfam Novib and conducted by researchers from 
organisations from the countries studied: in Somaliland/Puntland this was the Social 
research and Development Institute (SORADI); in Afghanistan the research was conducted 
by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity, Afghanistan (CPAU). With the study, Oxfam 
Novib aimed ‘to understand how [..] local structures emerge and transform, how people 
construct their own human security, and how outside actors can relate themselves to such 
developments.’ (Oxfam Novib 2010a: 1). The idea was to tailor intervention repertoires better 
to locally emergent institutional arrangements. The study took place in the framework of 
a broader program entitled IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States, a collaboration 
between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch NGOs and academic institutions. A 
team from Oxfam Novib and the IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States elaborated the 
research framework and provided feedback throughout the process.3 
2 In a similar vein Van der Haar 2001 developed the notion ‘governance beyond government’ (Van der Haar 2001).
3 The team included: Wim de Regt, Sarah-Jane Koulen, Gemma Andriessen, Fons van Overbeek, Thea Hilhorst, Peter Tamas,  and Gemma van 
der Haar; end responsibility rested with Anne Pieter van Dijk and Gemma van der Haar.
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This report synthesizes the findings and discussions as presented in the research reports on 
the regions of study: ‘Governance without government’: local non-state governance structures 
providing human security in Sanaag Region, Somaliland, Puntland (SORADI 2011) and Local 
institutions: people shaping their human security, a case study from Afghanistan (Rassul 
2012). The report builds on key texts generated in the course of the research program: the 
original proposal (Oxfam Novib 2010a); an outline of the conceptual discussion on fragile 
states and non-state institutions (De Regt et al 2010), approach papers prepared by the 
partner organisations (SORADI 2010, CPAU 2010) and the analytical choices made during 
a preparation workshop in November 2010 (Oxfam Novib 2010b). Reference to these 
documents is made where appropriate.
The report is set up as follows:
This introduction is followed by a section that outlines the conceptual framework that 
underpins this project, with reference to the relevant literature on non-state institutions in 
fragile states (chapter 2). After that, the research approach and methodology are discussed 
(chapter 3). The two sections that follow form the core of the report and present  the main 
findings. The first section (chapter 4) discusses what local institutions and arrangements 
were found on the ground, and the second (chapter 5) zooms in on key aspects of the way 
these institutions worked and interacted in view of threats to people’s security. The final 
section (chapter 6) sums up the main conclusions, discusses the contribution of the studies 
to the debate on non-state institutions, and considers implications for interventions.
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2
Local institutions and human security: 
Research framework
This study is interested in how local state and non-state institutions are put to work in 
people’s efforts to cope with multiple insecurities in their everyday life. It intersects concerns 
around state fragility with concerns around human security. Starting point for the study has 
been the insight, voiced insistently by critics of the notion of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states, that 
fragile states are not ungoverned spaces but instead feature forms of governance and of local 
ordering that emerge from within, organised by conflict-affected societies to make up for the 
deficiencies of the state (De Regt et al 2010; Christoplos and Hilhorst 2009; Hilhorst et al 
2010). While gaining prominence in the context of a retreating state, these institutions may 
have existed prior to state formation. This study wants to understand how these emergent 
arrangements and forms of local governance work. Given that, as the initiators of the study 
put it, ‘not much is known about how people shape their lives in fragile environments, about 
the role of local institutions ordering their lives, about the emergence of home-grown local 
orders, how they function in practice, and about concrete changes due to external influences’ 
(De Regt et al 2010: 21), the aim of the study is ‘an empirical analysis of governance 
institutions as they are, how they work, and how they are deemed useful by the people affected 
by them’(De Regt et al 2010: 3, italics added).
An important starting point and source of inspiration for the research was the notion of 
‘Governance without government’ developed by Kenneth Menkhaus and his colleagues. 
To the initiators of the research this notion suggested that fragile states do not imply 
ungoverned societies. Conflict-affected societies have the capacity to provide for human 
needs of security, order and development, without the necessity of a central state. As 
the program developed, other notions were introduced to complement and nuance the 
understanding on the role and importance of non-state institutions in the context of state 
fragility, such as ‘hybrid political orders’ and ‘institutional multiplicity’ (discussed below). 
Participants in the start-up workshop in November 2010, from the organisations that 
would carry out the research, reacted to the implicit assumption that non-state institutions, 
customary or otherwise, could fully substitute for the state at the local level. Instead, they 
argued, it was also important to uphold the ideal of a well-functioning and responsive state. 
This was why, in second instance, the more neutral term ‘local institutions’ was adopted for 
the research program, allowing for non-state as well as state institutions to come into the 
picture.
Below, the most important theoretical notions that informed the study are introduced.
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Conceptualising non-state institutions in fragile states
One problem in the fragile states debate has been that it emphasized especially what is not 
there, i.e. how states fall short in their performance and fail to provide for security, order and 
services for their citizens, and that there is a need to ‘build’ or ‘fix’ the state. This vantage 
point is not very helpful – as critics have pointed out - if we want to understand how societies 
in fragile states work, how people survive, how things ‘get done’. In response, several 
scholars have drawn attention to the importance of non-state institutions and arrangements 
in conflict-affected societies to fill the ‘governance gap’ created by a fragile state. The present 
study builds on the notions and insights developed by these scholars.
We build in this paper on broad definitions of institutions as forms of social order and 
regularised patterns of behaviour. Our working definition has been to understand institutions 
as the ways in which, and structures through which, society is ordered and public goods are 
provided for. State institutions are those endorsed and supported by a central state, and part 
of the formal state structure. Non-state institutions are those that operate outside of the 
formal support and endorsement of the state structure, though they might be recognised to 
some extent within that formal structure. State and non-state institutions are often labelled 
as formal and informal institutions respectively, but this is not entirely adequate, given the 
fact that  non-state institutions may have a highly structured, formalised character. Non-state 
institutions may be based on custom and tradition, in which case they are termed customary 
institutions. Non-state institutions are not limited to customary institutions but may include 
newly emerging institutions, developed from the ground up or introduced by external actors 
(development agencies, armed oppositions groups, etc).
The notion of ‘Governance without government’ has served as a major source of inspiration for 
this study. It was coined by Kenneth Menkhaus and his colleagues on the basis of what they 
saw in Somalia, where the collapse of the central state did not mean a collapse of society. 
Rather, societal arrangements developed to fill the gap created by the failing state, grafted 
upon customary institutions while also re-functionalising these institutions to meet new 
challenges (Menkhaus 2006). Through these institutions, Somalis were able to organize for 
many of the key functions around security, order, basic services and representation. Thus, 
the central argument of Menkhaus and his colleagues is that societies have the capacity to 
organize ‘governance’ without having to rely on a [state] ‘government’. 
As the study progressed, additional notions were taken up that have shaped the research 
design. This is first, the notion of ‘hybrid political orders’, developed by Volker Boege and 
his colleagues (Boege et al 2009), and second, the notion of ‘institutional multiplicity’ (Di 
John 2008;  Christoplos and Hilhorst 2009; Van der Haar 2012). The two notions are closely 
related, though there is some difference in emphasis.
The central idea captured in the notion of hybrid political orders is that fragile states rely to 
an important degree on non-state institutions in order to perform their governance functions. 
In the regions they researched (mostly researched South East Asia/Pacific), Boege and his 
colleagues found customary institutions to be key to making the state work: the provision 
of security, order, justice, and basic services relied on an intricate interplay of state and 
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customary institutions. The idea expressed in ‘hybrid political orders’ is that state and 
non-state institutions intertwine in the exercise of governance. Through this interaction, 
institutions from different origin (state and customary) mutually shape each other and the 
distinction state/non-state may get blurred.
The notion of ‘institutional multiplicity’, coined by the Crisis States Research Center, similarly 
focuses on the organisation of governance by other actors than a central state. The central 
idea is that in fragile and post-conflict settings multiple sets of institutions may emerge that 
provide the security and services that the state does not or cannot provide (DiJohn 2008;  
Christoplos and Hilhorst 2009; van der Haar 2012). In comparison with the notion of hybrid 
political orders, the idea of institutional multiplicity places less emphasis on customary 
institutions,  based on tradition, and instead highlights the possibility that armed groups, 
resistance movements and international humanitarian organisations take up governance 
functions. It is thus a welcome addition to the notion of hybrid political orders. Institutional 
multiplicity furthermore recognizes different possible types of interaction between state and 
non-state institutions. Next to intertwining, highlighted in the work on hybrid political orders, 
it considers rivalry, pragmatic accommodation, or functional complementarity (Van der Haar 
2012; Van der Haar and Heijke 2013).
Following the ideas in the literature on hybrid political orders and institutional multiplicity, 
the initiators of this research program defined the scope of non-state governance in a broad 
way (De Regt et al 2010), to include:
•	 Customary/traditional forms of authority and social organisation
•	 Civil society: community-based groupings and arrangements
•	 Humanitarian actors: UN or INGO based, in protracted conflicts and war-to-peace 
transitions
•	 Rebel groups, criminal networks
•	 Diaspora actors
•	 Entrepreneurial actors
The research thus kept an open mind as to the nature of the institutions that would be found 
to be relevant in the field. Similarly, it kept an open mind to the types of interactions and 
intertwining that could develop between different sets of institutions. 
The study focuses on conflict-affected regions. These regions have been located, 
geographically or politically, at the ‘fringes of the state’ (Van der Haar 2012; De Regt et 
al 2010), where the presence of the central state was historically marginal due to e.g. 
physical remoteness or lack of strategic interest. In these ‘marginal’ contexts, local societies 
have typically developed robust and elaborate institutions and arrangements to cater for 
local needs of order and public goods. The institutions encountered in our study are to 
an important degree based on tradition and custom and hence labelled ‘customary’ or 
‘traditional’ institutions. In the conflict and post-conflict settings studied in this report, 
some of these customary institutions are re-invigorated and take on new functions in order 
to respond to the governance gaps created by a (partly) retreating state. As people seek to 
respond to the challenges of these changes, old institutions change and new arrangements 
emerge. We have tried to capture this with the term ‘home-grown’ institutions.
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Human security in fragile states
Human security is under threat in post-conflict settings. This research is concerned with how 
people organize to cope with the multiple insecurities of their everyday lives and how they 
seek to enhance their security through local institutions. The study is not limited to physical 
insecurity following from violent conflict, but rather considers multiple risks, threats, and 
sources of insecurity: violence and conflict, as well as droughts, loss of assets, or precarious 
livelihoods.
The notion of human security came up to redefine the central concern of security. Security 
should no longer be understood as the security of the state but as the security of human 
beings, ‘a concern with human life and dignity’ (United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 1994: 22). In its original definition it includes safety from chronic threats such as 
hunger, disease and repression, as well as protection from shocks and disruptions due to 
e.g. conflict and disaster (UNDP 1994: 22). It comprises both freedom from fear (including 
personal physical security, political security) and freedom from want (socio-economic 
security, including freedom from hunger, economic security and health) (De Regt et al 2010: 
9).
The particular interest of this study has been to understand how local institutions work and 
contribute to human security (De Regt et al 2010: 13). The study is interested in the way in 
which institutions and governance shape the pursuit of human security in fragile settings. 
In line with this, the field studies were designed to start from what people experience as 
key threats to their human security and then analyse the responses of different types of 
institutions to these.
A camel herd just watered and leaving 
its dry season well in Sanaag region.
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Local institutions and human security: Research approach
In order to understand how local institutions matter to human security in fragile settings, 
this research opted for tracing real responses of real institutions to real problems. To capture 
this, the central question was phrased as follows:
How do people interact with local governance institutions (state/non-state, formal/informal) to 
shape their human security? (Oxfam Novib 2010b: 2)
Sub questions were formulated (Oxfam Novib 2010b: 2/3), related to: 
•	 Key issues in the pursuit of human security, as defined by people locally, which could be 
related to livelihood, security and order, or public services;
•	 Institutions people turn to in pursuit of a solution to their problems, and with what 
motivations and expectations
•	 The response of these institutions and the outcomes in addressing the needs
•	 The reach, usefulness, effectiveness and legitimacy of these institutions, as evident from the 
above
•	 The dynamics of change of these institutions 
The fieldwork would focus on real-life problems: How were institutions put to work by people 
in the face of these threats or problems? How did these institutions address the issue and 
how was that evaluated by the affected population? And: What does that tell us about the 
importance of these institutions for human security?
The research wanted to make visible what different local institutions mean in people’s lives 
without making a priori assumptions about what works and what does not. The research 
was open-minded about the reach of different institutions, their effectiveness, or legitimacy; 
these would be established through the fieldwork. The kind of topics to which governance 
could relate was defined broadly, including conflict resolution and administration of justice, 
resource access and management, the provision of basic services, taxation and economic 
regulation (De Regt et al 2010: 24). The idea behind this was that governance spans many 
aspects of local life and that which of these would be highlighted in the field studies would 
depend on the context and what were felt to be strong needs locally.
The methodology that was elaborated meant to identify and follow specific concerns that 
were deemed relevant locally. A first step was to identify these concerns and the next step 
would then be to trace to which institutions people turned to resolve their issues, the ways 
in which different institutions responded to these issues, and the kind of outcomes this 
produced. In this way, the research hoped to get a notion of the reach, effectiveness and 
legitimacy (or lack thereof) of different types of local institutions based on real life.
Central in this methodology is the question: Who [what institution] do people turn to? This 
was inspired by Bruce Baker’s study on policing in fragile settings (Baker 2005), on which he 
reports in his article ‘Who do people turn to for policing in Sierra Leone’. This entry point, 
of following real people with real concerns, has the advantage of moving beyond merely 
‘mapping’ the institutions, towards getting a grasp on how institutions work. People’s 
15
discussions about their motivations, expectations and experiences, their evaluations 
of the way different institutions dealt with their problems, tells us about legitimacy and 
effectiveness: When and why do people experience institutional responses as appropriate, 
effective, or legitimate? We also chose this methodology in order to be able to analyse 
how institutions transform and interact with each other on the ground, and with what 
consequences.
To sum up, with this approach we hoped to contribute to the understanding of local 
institutions and human security in essentially three ways:
•	 Understanding the workings of local institutions: The research wanted to move beyond 
analysing the mere existence of institutions at the local level, to analyse their actual 
functioning in the face of threats, insecurity and vulnerability.
•	 Understanding the interaction between different types of institutions: The research 
took as a starting point that local institutions do not operate in a vacuum, but in a 
field of institutional multiplicity. In the response to human security problems, multiple 
institutions play a role and they may influence and interact with each other.
•	 Understanding how institutions change: In the face of specific concerns and contextual 
changes, local institutions transform. New arrangements may emerge, partly grafted 
on what was there; existing institutions may transform; some may develop and re-
functionalize, others may lose ground. The institutional responses crafted by local 
societies are a function both of what is needed (the governance ‘need’) and of what is 
there (the institutions ‘on offer’).
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Research set-up and process
Research set-up
The initiators of the programme at Oxfam Novib selected three countries for field research: 
Somaliland/Puntland4, Afghanistan, and South Sudan (where the study could not be 
completed). These countries were selected on the basis of a combination of theoretical and 
practical considerations. First, these are countries with a high state fragility, related to violent 
conflict, and where one would expect to find non-state institutions for local order, security 
and service provision at the local level (SORADI 2010, CPAU 2010, RBC 2010). Second, 
Oxfam Novib had partners in these countries which could be involved in the research.5
It was an explicit choice of Oxfam Novib to have the research conducted by local 
organisations, in line with their overall approach. In this way, Oxfam Novib would allow 
knowledge about local issues to be collected and processed by local actors, a modus which 
the organisation believed would contribute to capacity building, one of its core mandates. 
From a research perspective, this choice offered the advantage of overcoming access and 
language problems that would have seriously limited external researchers.
For each of the selected regions, Oxfam Novib identified local organisations which had a 
strong network and previous research experience ‘on the ground’ and which hosted the 
necessary research capacity. These organisations were then contracted for the research 
programme, each for three months. The research process included the development of 
a conceptual background paper by the IS Academy partners (De Regt et al 2010) and a 
preparatory workshop with the main researchers from the three countries to discuss the 
approach, the methodologies and the desired outputs. Scholars from Disaster Studies 
at Wageningen University (including the author of the present report) acted as resource 
persons and facilitators during the workshop. As an outcome of this workshop, the 
central research questions were defined (Oxfam Novib 2010b). In line with the ambitions 
of the programme, a range of qualitative methods were proposed, with semi-structured 
interviewing and focus group discussions as the main elements.
The research teams selected the regions and within these the specific sites which were 
considered particularly interesting for the purpose of the research, while also being 
4 This report follows the terminology used in the original report to indicate the border area between Somaliland and Puntland. This use of 
terminology does not imply any judgment on the formal status of the region.
5 South Sudan would have been a particularly interesting case to understand how local institutions change in the face of post-conflict state-
building.
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accessible to the researchers. The teams were to adapt and operationalize the overall design 
into specific instruments (e.g. interview protocols) which allowed them to adjust to the 
specificities of the context as well as the capacities of the research team. In preparation for 
the fieldwork each of the teams wrote an ‘approach paper’ (SORADI 2010; CPAU 2010; RBC 
2010) in which the choices were justified.
The fieldwork was organised and carried out by the local partners. In the three countries, 
research teams were formed with both senior partners and local fieldworkers. Reports were  
submitted for feedback to the programme responsibles at Oxfam Novib and academic 
facilitators from the IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States (including the author of this 
report). In response to the feedback received, the reports were finalised. This synthesis report 
relies on these reports.
As the research progressed, some limitations to the chosen set-up became apparent. One 
limitation was that the fieldwork itself was not followed closely by the research initiators 
or the academic facilitators from the Netherlands. This has implied that many of the key 
methodological choices, such as the selection of respondents, selection of interviewers, 
the interview protocols, and the processing of the interviews, have not been part of joint 
reflection. A closer look at methodological choices would have supported the interpretation 
of the findings. Closer contact during this period might also have avoided the unfortunate 
outcome in the South Sudan case, where the research team was not able to complete the 
study, even though they were active participants in the first phases of the research..
In addition, it became clear that the ambitions for the research, in terms of the depth of the 
analysis on the workings of institutions (incl. interaction and dynamics), could not be fully 
met, given the time frame and the background of the research teams.
Somaliland/Puntland study: Sanaag region
The team at SORADI selected Sanaag region for conducting the study. It was selected 
for being the most remote and least developed area of Somaliland/Puntland, which has 
historically strongly relied on community structures and traditional arrangements for order, 
security and basic social services (SORADI 2011: 6/7). To this day, it is one of the regions least 
incorporated into state structures. Field research in Sanaag aimed at ‘analyzing governance 
in conditions of protracted state failure and relative absence of formal government structures. 
[...] The research findings involve the practical attempts by populations and individuals […] to 
cope with the consequences of long-term state collapse and political crisis’ (SORADI 2011: 3).
The collapse of the Somali central state has meant that government structures and services 
largely disappeared from the region (SORADI 2011: 73). Neither one of the two competing 
political entities has full effective control over the region, and especially in the rural areas 
there is a ‘de facto absence of formal governance structures’ (SORADI 2011: 74). Since 1997, 
the Somaliland administration has established a police force, judiciary systems as well as 
regional and district administrations, but these have been mostly limited to the bigger towns 
(SORADI 2011:14).
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The research focused on four communities situated on the clan-border lines in Sanaag 
region.6 These villages were selected because they have relied on self-governance for a long 
period and have been at the frontline of the armed struggle between the Somali National 
Movement and the Barre regime. Most of these villages were also venues for the peace 
meetings during 1991-1993 (SORADI 2011: 9).
The research was conducted in several stages in a period spanning from April to December 
2011. A mix of qualitative and quantitative methods was used. One-to-one interviews (60) 
were conducted with selected key informants including local leaders such as sub-clan and 
lineage elders as well as other community members, and representatives of the regional and 
district government. Several focus group discussions were held and participatory appraisal 
techniques were used to rank institutions according to their importance in the local context. 
In addition, a questionnaire was conducted including 40 individuals forming a cross section 
of the studied communities.
The research was organized and conducted by a team of researchers and enumerators led by 
Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, deputy director of SORADI, based in Hargeisa, Somaliland (SORADI 
2011: 7/8).
In addition to the general appraisal of institutional complexity, the field study focused on two 
particular issues of concern affecting human security at the time of research: the drought 
that faced the region in the first half of 2011 and a conflict between two clans that led to 
violence in the second half of 2011 (SORADI 2011: 8). These were two situations experienced 
by people as critical threats to their security putting their existence under pressure.
Afghanistan study: Takhar and Kunduz provinces
CPAU was the organisation in charge of the Afghanistan study. The CPAU team decided to 
focus on two areas of key concern in human security as experienced by ‘ordinary Afghans’. 
The rule of law, especially the role of the informal justice system was studied in Takhar 
province. Water access and institutions that govern water distribution, were studied in 
Kunduz province. These areas of focus were chosen based on previous research by CPAU, 
and motivated by CPAU’s familiarity with the area, allowing the researchers to build on the 
contacts and trust already established (Rassul 2012: 3).
In both provinces, decades of war and violence lead to the breakdown of institutions, both 
state and non-state. In Takhar, the decades of war severely damaged both the material 
infrastructure (e.g. court houses) and the human capital of the formal justice system (Rassul 
2012: 17). Takhar province was at the frontline of war between Mujahedeen and Taliban, 
leading to the collapse of the justice system. The fall of the Taliban created a vacuum (ibid: 
23). Considerable investments have been made since 2001 but these have not been able 
to bring it up to the required level (ibid: 17). In Kunduz, traditional water management 
structures eroded, which has given rise to pervasive conflicts around water management 
(Rassul 2012).
6 Jidali, Carmaale, Shimbiraale and Dararweyne
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Local Afghans in Kunduz and Takhar expressed a strong concern with physical security: they 
identified peace and security as a basic requirement for human security. In addition, they 
had strong concerns with their economic and livelihood situation. Many respondents were 
insecure about being able to provide for their families (Rassul 2012: 5/6).
Data collection in both Takhar and Kunduz took place between June and October 2011, in two 
rounds. The research team employed qualitative methodologies. The first round relied mostly 
on focus group discussions including community members and formal and informal officials 
(four focus group discussions in each province). The second round of data collection was 
done through structured interviews with employees or leaders of formal institutions, informal 
institutions, as well as with community members (30 in Takhar, 57 in Kunduz) (Rassul 2012).
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State and non-state institutions ‘on the 
ground’
The studies in Somaliland/Puntland and Afghanistan clearly brought out the importance of 
customary and informal institutions in everyday life. In both cases, state presence has been 
affected by violent conflict and on-going political contestation. Efforts at state building are 
on-going but, at the time of research, these had as yet done little to increase the presence 
or legitimacy of the state ‘on the ground’. Local institutions developed to this background 
of a distant and contested state. This did not mean that the state was absent or irrelevant 
in people’s understanding. Perhaps surprisingly, the state was a central reference also for 
people mostly governed, in everyday life, by customary institutions.
The importance of customary institutions
In both regions studied, customary institutions were found to be prominent, well-rooted 
in local society and highly significant in resolving issues of order, security and conflict 
resolution, and resource access and management. These institutions have evolved largely in 
the context of historically absent or distant states. Protracted conflict had the effect of further 
limiting the effective presence of the state, which created both the room and the necessity for 
local arrangements and institutions to develop.
In Sanaag region, the research found people to rely strongly on traditional arrangements 
and institutions. The collapse of the Somali central state has meant that state structures 
and services largely disappeared from the region (SORADI 2011: 74). In response, people 
turned to what they knew, leading to a strengthening of customary institutions. As the report 
puts it:  Sanaag ‘has seen the reconstitution and emergence of a whole range of informal 
arrangements, associations and local agreements between non-state authorities such as 
clan elders, customary authorities, and community based organisations and transnational 
businessmen that try to cope with the uncertainty of state collapse and political crisis’ 
(SORADI 2011: 3). The customary system is unchallenged: ‘All the respondents agreed 
that the traditional system of governance comprising the Council of Elders, clan and sub-
clan chiefs, and religious men are the most trusted and effective social arrangements and 
institutions in the region’ (SORADI 2011: 14). The state is experienced as largely absent: 
‘Government agencies have been inactive since the collapse of central administration in 
1991’(ibid).
Respondents relate the salience of customary arrangements to the history of state 
disintegration and retreat: ‘Though the traditional system of governance has always 
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functioned in parallel with the formal state and government, it was during conflict and after 
the collapse of the state that the Somali people, including those in Sanaag, turned back to 
their ‘tradition’ as a source of knowledge and experience for solving their problems and 
started seeking the Elders to restore stability’ (SORADI 2011: 17).
For Takhar, Afghanistan, the picture is similar. Fieldwork in Takhar province indicates that ‘the 
informal justice institutions are the primary institutions turned to by the community members 
when facing a conflict. All respondents, no matter their age, gender or societal status, have 
answered that whenever faced with a justice issue, they first approach the informal justice 
institutions’ (Rassul 2012: 17). In this province, ‘the formal legal system has never really been 
centralized or managed to adequately penetrate into rural areas of the country’ (Rassul 2012: 
7). Formal rule of law has been ‘fragmented’ and had ‘limited reach, especially into rural areas’ 
(Rassul 2012: 8).
Alongside this ineffective and fragmented formal legal system, the informal justice system has 
developed and become central to justice at the local level. Disputes that cannot be solved at 
the level of individual families are solved through informal justice institutions, amongst which 
the Jirga and/or Shura are the most significant. (Rassul 2012: 8) These institutions are ‘well 
developed’ and ‘deeply embedded’ in local society (ibid: 9), and thus fill the gap left by formal 
justice institutions. It is estimated that around 80% of all disputes in Afghanistan ‘are solved 
through the informal institutions’ (Senier 2006, Coburn & Dempsey 2010, in Rassul 2012: 10).
The field study on Kunduz, on water governance, sketches a slightly different picture. Here 
it was not state governance, but a traditional institution for water governance that was 
undermined by the years of conflict. The distribution of irrigation water in Kunduz has 
historically relied on the Mirab system (discussed in more detail below), backed by the state. 
Fieldwork in this region found that the war has however eroded the effective working and the 
legitimacy of the Mirab system and that it was losing ground. People have increasingly turned 
to the informal justice institutions to solve water-related problems previously addressed by the 
Mirab (Rassul 2012).
‘Home-grown’ institutions: Tradition, and more
Many of the most prominent and significant institutions found during fieldwork in the regions 
of study can be called ‘customary’, that is, rooted in the customs and traditions of the local 
society and ‘informal’, in the sense of , not designed or managed by the state system. These 
institutions are associated with historically grown social formations (clans, tribes, localities). 
They are perceived by local actors as ‘home-grown’, developed in and recognised by the 
local society.7 In addition to arrangements rooted in tradition, the field studies also showed 
emergent community-based arrangements to respond to specific needs. Though at least partly 
grafted on customary forms of deliberation and consultation, these arrangements take on new 
forms and functions.
7 This does however not exclude that they may have been shaped by state intervention in the past, as is quite clearly shown in the case of Afgha-
nistan.
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In both case studies, customary institutions referred to include authorities, as well as bodies 
of norms and rules, and mechanisms for consultation and deliberation.  In Sanaag, many of 
the traditional institutions are organized on a clan or sub-clan basis. The main institutions 
include the Guurti or Council of Elders, which exists at different levels, from the local to 
the national. The main role of the Guurti at the local level relates to dispute settlement and 
resource management, but their function is often broader: the Guurti ‘plays the roles of all 
the non-existent or ineffective government institutions’ (SORADI 2011: 18). Guurti members 
are nominated by clan members and ‘serve without payment’ (SORADI 2011: 18). At the level 
of individual villages, one finds village headmen and committees (SORADI 2011: 19).8
These customary authorities work with and enforce a body of rules known as Xeer, or 
‘covenants’. There are ‘typically strong sanctions for violating these Xeer, with monitoring 
and enforcement controlled by the Guurti or Council of Elders’ (SORADI 2011: 40). A last key 
element in customary arrangements in Sanaag are the Shir, gatherings or meetings which are 
called to address ‘any major decision that would impact the community, whether it concerns 
the distribution of resources, creation of laws, or, most importantly, resolving conflicts’ 
(SORADI 2011: 23; following Lewis 1999).
In the informal justice system in Afghanistan we similarly find customary authorities, 
meetings and a body of rules. Jirga is the term used for the ‘consultative gathering’ which 
can involve a few or a large number of people (Rassul 2012: 8). The term shura, from Arabic, 
similarly refers to the process of ‘consultation’, though it has a more permanent character, 
like a council (Rassul 2012: 8/9; following Coburn and Dempsey 2010). These informal 
institutions function at community or supra-communal level. They work on the basis of a 
customary body of rules and norms called narkh, and the views of the authorities in charge, 
the marakachian, a body of esteemed elders and leaders. The judgement they issue, the 
prikra, is morally and socially binding (Rassul 2012: 9).
Next to these institutions based on tradition and custom, the Sanaag study highlighted the 
importance of flexible community-based arrangements, the so called ‘ad hoc committees’. 
These are committees formed at the community level to respond to specific needs and 
8 Most of these institutions are mostly or exclusively open to men. Women hold weekly meetings, the Sitaad, which serves as a coordination 
and dispute resolution institution between women (SORADI 2011: 20).
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A village/clan Guurti discussing 
drought problems.
critical events: ‘Whenever a certain type of crisis happens they respond by forming an ad 
hoc committee which is assigned to look after that issue until […] [it] no longer is a threat 
to peace and stability of the community. The ad hoc committees constitute the basic social 
arrangements or institutions that serve the community in various capacities’ (SORADI 2011: 
15). Interestingly, these committees are only referred to, in the study, by their English name. It 
is not possible, on the basis of what the Sanaag study reveals, to go into further detail about 
the history of these committees (are they based on earlier forms of social organisation or a 
recent innovation?), or the way they relate to the Guurti.
Also the Afghanistan study shows that the traditional goes hand in hand with flexibility and 
innovation. In Kunduz fieldwork found that the informal justice system, based on shura/
jirga,  started to assume a broader range of functions that had not been part of its traditional 
mandate, such as, in this particular case,  issues of water governance.
Other non-state institutions: local civil society, international 
agencies, the private sector, and armed groups
Both studies found that other non-state institutions were present in the local institutional 
landscape, next to the customary structures.
The Sanaag study mentions a range of institutions that fulfil governance functions to 
compensate for the ‘missing’ state: trade and business networks (especially in the urban 
settings), loan providers, and local and international NGOs: ‘ Many non-state actors 
emerged and assumed government roles’ (SORADI 2011: 20/21). The study elaborates most 
on the role of international NGOs that engage especially in service delivery, and sometimes 
in the provision of humanitarian aid. The study stresses that these organisations generally 
coordinate their activities with the Guurti or village committees (ibid: 33), in what is overall 
deemed a rather successful combination.
The Afghanistan study on the contrary brings out the role of armed groups opposing the 
Afghan state. In the regions they control, armed opposition groups form another layer of 
governance, next to the customary governance. These groups may function like a parallel 
state. In some cases, as shown, they develop ‘their own complex legal system’:  ‘In AOG 
[armed opposition groups] controlled areas, when a dispute cannot be solved by local 
informal institutions, the disputants will turn to the local AOG commander’ (Rassul 2012: 
14). The case, if not resolved, can be taken up at higher levels, e.g. the Justice Committee of 
the AOG District Commission.
How does the state fit in?
Does the state have any place alongside non-state institutions exercising governance? 
In the studies on Afghanistan and Somaliland/Puntland, the state is both ‘absent’ and 
‘present’ in the local institutional field. Though fieldwork highlights the limited presence 
and effectiveness of the state, and brings out the reliance on customary and other non-state 
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institutions, it also found the state to be part of people’s horizons and to be present as an 
idea (Abrams 1988 [1977]) and a resource.
People are supposedly connected to the state through structures that reach down to the local 
level. These are, however, experienced as far removed from the immediate on-the-ground 
realities of people’s lives. In the case of Sanaag, following the introduction of a multi-party 
system in Somaliland in 2001, elected District Councils were formed in 2002 (SORADI 
2011:28), ‘elected by and represent[ing] all the major villages’ in the district (SORADI 2011: 
27). However, the fieldwork suggests that these bodies remain geographically distant and 
come into the picture only under extraordinary circumstances, i.e. when the problem at hand 
exceeds local capacity to handle it. Respondents ‘confirmed that they rarely see or meet the 
representatives or authorities of the formal governments that claim jurisdiction over their 
localities. These entities come to the areas only when they need the political support of the 
local people and their leader’ (SORADI 2011: 63).
In everyday life, people experience the state as ‘missing’ or ‘absent’, yet it was certainly 
present as a reference. Respondents voiced concern with this ‘missing’ state, upholding an 
ideal in which the state would be the ultimate provider of order, security and services. In this 
regard, CPAU noted ‘There is a strong belief among the respondents […] that it is the state 
which is responsible for providing security’ (Rassul 2012: 20). Respondents understood 
local institutions and arrangements as ‘nested’ in this bigger construct of the national state 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002). The fieldwork shows how people consider the state as a fall-back 
option when problems cannot be solved locally.
Relative legitimacies
In the regions of study, a situation of institutional multiplicity was found where ‘governing’ is 
done by both state and non-state institutions. How do local actors perceive and experience 
this multiplicity? How do they plot the customary, state and non-state institutions in relation 
to each other? In both cases, people were found to compare and contrast institutions in 
terms of their legitimacy and performance. Typically, the worst classifications were being 
reserved for the state. As put in the Afghanistan study: ‘Most respondents declared that they 
see the government as entirely corrupt and always seeking to rob its people of their money, 
without solving any of their problems (Rassul 2012: 35).
In Sanaag, respondents were asked to judge local institutions on the basis of criteria 
developed together with them. These criteria included achievements, honesty and patience; 
justice and equity; transparency and accountability; decision making capacity; willingness 
to take advice; how fast they respond to needs; voluntarism; and concern for marginalised 
groups (SORADI 2011: 60). From people’s ranking of institutions based on these criteria the 
Guurti and other customary leadership rank amongst the highest, but so do NGOs (with 
regional variations). The government is ranked at the lower end (SORADI 2011: 61 table). 
This resembles the findings in Afghanistan (Rassul 2012: 18 box), where the following reasons 
are given for why people choose to come to the shura: they ‘solve our problems without any 
salary’; ‘they are honest’, ‘we know them better’; ‘we can easily have access to them’.
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State and customary institutions are contrasted in stark terms. In Sanaag traditional leaders 
are seen as ‘relatively legitimate’ whereas government officials are seen as ‘predatory and 
corrupt’ (SORADI 2011: 36). Government officials are discredited for using ‘patronage and 
strategic co-optation’  of clan representatives to ‘mobilize loyalty from the community’ (ibid: 
36). Local governments are seen to lack skill, capacity and motivation (SORADI 2011: 30). 
Traditional leaders on the other hand are imputed with positive motivations, such as the 
willingness to serve their clan, though an interest in personal gain is not excluded: ‘Most 
respondents believe that the primary motivation of the traditional leaders is to look after the 
interests of their clan groups, and that mostly includes stopping harm from coming to their 
groups.’ (SORADI 2011: 15) This does not mean an uncritical attitude towards the customary 
system. Respondents recognised that traditional leaders are also motivated by other factors 
including clan interests, personal responsibility, ‘prestige and financial gain, interest in 
leadership and empowerment’ (SORADI 2011: 15).
The study in Takhar province (Afghanistan) similarly found that people tended to credit 
the customary institutions for being ‘more accessible, trusted and time efficient’, whereas 
they discredited the formal system for corruption, nepotism and bad performance (Rassul 
2012: 17/18). Rassul suggests that: ‘the positive perception of the informal justice system 
seems to be shaped more by the misconduct of the formal justice system rather than the 
conduct of the informal justice system’ (2012: 17). However, it is also a positive choice. The 
research showed ‘that people opt for the informal system because they are led by well-known, 
trusted, and respected elders, active in the community and with a reputation of being fair 
and devoted’ (Rassul 2012: 19). In addition, ‘decisions are made according to well-known 
traditional rules rooted in cultural values’ (ibid). The informal justice institutions combine 
both traditional authority and sufficient competence, which contributes to decisions which 
satisfy all parties, in most cases (ibid).
Also the fact that the informal justice system in Afghanistan works with ‘restorative justice’ 
contributes to its legitimacy. Restorative justice, as has also been argued for other parts of 
the world, allows for a restoration of social relationships and with that of people’s ‘support 
structures, enabling people to manage various kinds of shocks’ (Rassul 2012: 11). Informal 
justice seeks the reintegration of offenders into their communities, and thus minimizes the 
damage to the household of which they are part (Rassul 2012: 11, 12).
In both cases studied (Somaliland/Puntland and Afghanistan) the research found that 
the legitimacy of customary institutions relates to whether customary authority is seen as 
mandated by and accountable to communities. Respondents in the Sanaag study highlighted 
that community members have possibilities to influence the selection and performance of 
traditional leaders and village-level committees. Local customary authorities or committees 
‘cannot enforce their decisions without the support of the overwhelming majority of the 
community’ (SORADI 2011: 39), though the question remains how such support is achieved. 
In the same vein Rassul concludes for the Kunduz study that it was precisely the lack of 
accountability of the traditional Mirab system that motivated people to turn to alternatives.
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5
Local institutions ‘at work’: Interaction 
and change
This section explores in more detail how state and non-state institutions interact and 
mutually influence each other in relation to specific problems. The analysis makes clear that 
a fair degree of functional complementarity exists between state and non-state institutions, 
especially in the case of Sanaag region, though instances of rivalry are also found. The 
studies also bring out that institutions, and the relations between them, transform, shaped 
by people’s choices in the search of solutions for their everyday problems and insecurity.
State and non-state institutions responding to crime and violence
In both Sanaag and Takhar the administration of justice and prosecution of crimes, is a 
task in which both state and non-state institutions play a role. This topic offers an excellent 
window on the nature of the interactions between different sets of institutions.
In the case of Sanaag, customary and state institutions were found to complement each 
other. In general terms, respondents – even those in government functions - highlighted 
the primacy and strength of the customary institutions: ‘Many respondents that were 
government representatives on the district and regional level admitted that the secular law 
system and the police rather assist the traditional authorities in fulfilling their functions 
than the other way around; and most governmental officers admitted quite openly their 
dependence on traditional elders: ‘without Elders we could not do anything’ (Erigavo police 
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A gathering for the announcement of 
the resolution of clan-conflict.
commander). The common view throughout Sanaag seems to be that the main function of the 
police is to assist traditional authorities’ (SORADI 2011: 26). There is some recognition also for 
the fact that this works both ways: ‘ the strength of the local authority also depends on strong 
government backing’, as they can call in police assistance for law enforcement. (ibid: 68). 
The relation is one of ‘nested’ institutions: the government comes into play mostly when the 
‘traditional system fails to resolve the conflict’ (SORADI 2011: 16; Ferguson & Gupta 2002).
In response to specific – and sometimes new -  challenges, a pragmatic and functional division 
of labour was developed. The fieldwork in Sanaag presents an interesting case of this. In 
Sanaag, elders, government officials and security forces collaborated to stop a cycle of revenge 
killings and armed clashes that went on for several years. Longer existing tensions between two 
sub-clans escalated as a police commander of one of these sub-clans was killed by gunmen 
from the other sub-clan in 2009. The conflict then broadened into an open confrontation 
between the latter sub-clan and the Somaliland military, which was brought in by the Governor 
to control the situation (SORADI 2011: 44). The sub-clan elders captured the murderer who 
was brought before a traditional council of elders as well as a sharia court. The civil court in 
turn executed the verdict (execution). On each side, a Committee of seven Elders was set up to 
manage the case and  contain further violence. They acted also as the liaison with government 
officials and the police.
These efforts, however, could not stop the cycle of violence, and further killings took place. 
The conflict attracted national interest and clan elders from other regions started to insist 
on a solution. A mediation committee was formed with five elders from each of the rivalling 
sub-clans, with the assignment ‘to investigate all murder cases and come up with a final 
ruling based on the traditional Xeer’ (ibid: 52). They would implement the decisions taken 
‘with the help of the government’ (ibid). Security forces enforced a curfew and were able to 
restore security (ibid: 53). In addition, fifty selected elders on both sides would take an oath to 
agree to the outcome of the mediation committee and ensure local compliance. The central 
government acted as the ‘coordinating body’ between the different groups.
This is a clear case of institutional multiplicity where different institutions complemented each 
other: decisions were based on Xeer, endorsed by all relevant actors, state and customary, and 
then ‘filed with the district and regional courts’, copies being sent also to the national high 
court (ibid: 54). Concerted efforts were taken in response to a situation that neither the state 
nor the elders were able to address on their own. An important factor in this multi-institutional 
solution was the fact that both victims were police officers. Elders argued that this meant that 
the cases exceeded their normal capacity (e.g. the responsibility to capture the fugitives) and 
that instead the responsibility ‘was on the side of the Somaliland government’ (ibid: 51). The 
case posed a new question: ‘the question is who is liable or responsible for the death caused 
by a police commander; the government or his sub-clan?’ (ibid: 55).
The study in Takhar province, Afghanistan, similarly found interaction between the formal 
and informal justice institutions, leading in this case to a hybrid system, where institutions 
intertwined. The different institutions were found to be ‘in the process of adapting to each 
other’ with ‘the notion of formal versus informal [is] slowly diminishing’ (CPAU 2012, in Rassul 
2012: 20). Citing from the report:
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‘The informal system is often focused on solving local cases which do not involve criminal 
acts, while the formal system is in charge of criminal cases, from assault, to murders, 
kidnappings, and criminal offences. […] The formal and informal justice institutions have 
responded to people’s needs and the situation at hand by increasing their communication 
with each other in terms of cases being referred to each other by either institutions and 
official documents sent by the formal system to the informal on specific cases that they had 
resolved. During the field research in Takhar CPAU found that there are instances where the 
informal system cannot resolve a dispute, primarily criminal cases and thus [the in]formal 
[system] refers it to the formal court system. While on the other hand there are minor civil 
cases which are deemed to take too much unnecessary time in the formal system which are 
referred to the informal system. During focus groups discussion in Takhar the respondents 
also mentioned a few instances where a dispute had grown worse in the formal system 
and was sent to the informal in order to get it resolved.’(ibid: 20/21, based on focus group 
discussions in Takhar) 
The study concludes that the informal justice institutions have become a ‘key component 
in people’s lives and in their strategies in addressing various human security concerns. 
[..] People use these institutions in order to access the formal system and thus minimize 
individual exposure to the shortcomings of the formal system through a collective approach’ 
(ibid: 37).
The study in Kunduz identifies a third actor in the field of justice: the justice system of the 
armed opposition groups. The study found this system to enter into competition with the 
customary justice system; the system of the armed opposition groups was found to put the 
informal system under pressure (ibid: 14). The study judges that the AOG justice system is 
‘not corrupt, swift and is rigidly enforced’, however, unlike the customary justice system, it is 
‘not focused on restoring relationships’ and ‘not in line with local traditions’ (Rassul 2012: 
15). The study makes an interesting remark on women’s access to justice: this is limited 
in both the formal and the informal justice system, where women are dependent on male 
relatives. In some cases, women can expect better outcomes from Taliban justice – the AOG 
system (Rassul 2012:15). This is an issue that deserves further exploration.
Multiple institutions responding to drought
During the fieldwork period in Sanaag, in 2011, a severe drought affected the region, leading 
to water shortage and high levels of livestock death. This led to high levels of livelihood 
stress. The situation prompted institutions at all levels to a response. The drought was a 
critical event that put existing institutions and governance arrangements to the ‘test’, and 
revealed their response capacity, their capacity to deal with new, unprecedented situations, 
and their capacity for concerted action.
The affected herder families initially relied ‘on their own resources and assets, such as 
distress sale of their livestock’ (SORADI 2011: 22). As the problems worsened community-
level solutions were sought. The Village Committee took on a prominent role linking other 
key actors such as the Guurti and the District Council representatives. As the study put it: ‘the 
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village committee is the primary interface of traditional/local and formal/national structures 
and is where the interaction takes place’ (ibid: 23).
In various localities so-called Drought or Emergency management committees were formed 
by the population (an example of the ad hoc committees mentioned in the previous chapter). 
For each of these committees, 5-7 members were selected for their ‘experience and capability 
to guide the community’ and ‘come up with solutions to mitigate the effects of drought’ 
(ibid: 23). Some of the committees included Guurti members. The Drought management 
committees collected information on the extent of the problem, consulted with different 
groups of population and proposed a number of measures, related to water management and 
distribution. They also organized calls for assistance to government, NGOs, and businessmen 
(ibid: 24-26).
Given the region-wide impact of the drought, the issue was taken to the level of the regional 
government. The governor of Sanaag  called for an emergency meeting which included 
regional governmental representatives as well as police and military commanders as well 
as prominent Guurti members (ibid: 28). In the meeting it was decided to ‘alert the national 
government and the international humanitarian agencies’ and ‘appeal for drought relief’(ibid: 
28); to create Drought response committees at the regional and district levels, and ‘officially 
recognize’ drought committees that had already been created at the local level by the Village 
Committees and local Guurti (ibid: 29).
The Drought Committee at district and village levels coordinated their actions, seeking to build 
on each others’ strengths. The District Drought Committee was responsible for fundraising 
and developing and executing a drought response plan, mostly water trucking. (ibid: 29): 
‘The District Committee published and disseminated the drought response plan, including 
the allocations and distribution plans to different villages and locations. This information is 
made public in order to reduce conflict over the sharing and distribution of resources’ (ibid: 
29). The village-level committees on their turn developed a ‘plan of sharing, allocating and 
distributing the resources among the affected villages and communities’: ‘The responsibility 
for the distribution and sharing at the village and rangeland locations is assigned to the Village 
Committees’, including the local Guurti. ‘Since they know the needs of their people they are 
the most suitable body to manage the local response to the drought’ (ibid).
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An Council of Elders waiting for a 
Government delegation to discuss 
community  issues. 
The central government of Somaliland also played a role. It declared an emergency situation 
and ‘published an international appeal for help’. The Somaliland government ‘organized 
and delivered funds for water trucking, technical assistance and […] maintenance of water 
sources’ (ibid: 31). The assistance amounted to about 20,000 USD (ibid: 31). In comparison, 
the District Drought Committee and Erigavo Municipality managed to raise 1500 USD each 
(29). The support mentioned did not fully cover the needs of the affected populations and 
additional support was given by international and national NGOs, CBOs, and through the 
diaspora (directly to their relatives) (ibid: 31, 35).
The drought response offers an example of complementarity between state and customary 
institutions at different levels and the development of new institutions and modes of working. 
Overall, respondents felt that ‘the multi-institutional response to the drought of 2011 has 
been relatively effective, efficient and timely’ (ibid:36). The study credits the arrangements 
that emerged for their ‘flexibility and pragmatism’. It was seen as very positive that despite 
the rivalry that was frequently seen to occur between government, traditional leaders, and civil 
society organisations, this experience demonstrated that they were able to work together (ibid: 
36). There was criticism of the fact that some politicians used the delivery of the assistance for 
political competition. The report suggests that the drought relief was delivered by a Ministerial 
Delegation ‘to display to the local communities and their traditional leadership that the 
government is concerned and cares about them and eventually gain political support from the 
local population’ (ibid: 31).
Changing institutions in water governance
The case study in Kunduz provides an example of how the relative importance and the 
relations between different institutions can change. As a traditional institution loses 
legitimacy, people try to change it or turn to another, trusted, institution to solve their water-
related concerns.
In Afghanistan much of the agricultural production relies on irrigation systems, such as 
canals, mostly shared by several communities. For the distribution of irrigation water between 
upstream and downstream villages and within villages people historically have relied on 
home-grown forms of water management. The central institution in water management has 
historically been the Mirab, which, with some regional variations, refers to an individual from 
the area, elected by the communities, in charge of ensuring fair water distribution between 
upstream and downstream villages. The Mirab usually receive payment for this work, through 
contributions of all land owning households in the area they are responsible for (Rassul 2012: 
30, also Lee 2007, Roe 2008). 
As a consequence of war, the Mirab system has lost effectiveness and legitimacy. Though 
it was still mentioned by respondents as central to water management, and approached by 
them for water-related concerns, people increasingly turn to ‘local informal justice systems for 
resolving water related conflicts’ (Rassul 2012: 32).
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Fieldwork found that the Mirab system is negatively affected by local divisions and the 
‘continued power struggles between the state, the Taliban and the local arbakis/warlords’. The 
Arbaki are local militia groups which override or co-opt Mirabs: ‘In front of the Arbaki, the Mirab 
does not have enough power to properly enforce its decisions’ and the Arbaki prevent the water 
from reaching downstream villages. As a farmer from the region stated: ‘Mirab was better 
than Arbaki at managing the water; now Arbaki just took over because they have weapons, [..] 
they are young and nobody can stand them, they just are afraid of them’ (cited in Rassul 2012: 
33). In some other cases, the Arbaki take over the Mirab’s functions in water distribution but 
privileging wealthier water users who can afford to pay more.
In earlier days, during the reign of Zahir Shah, the enforcement capacity of the Mirab relied 
increasingly on government support (e.g. providing police assistance). The current weakness 
of the state has meant that the Mirab is no longer able to enforce its decisions effectively 
(Rassul 2012: 34). The Mirab system has responded by resorting to corruption (‘bribes for 
water’), seeking alliance with powerful actors, which could be Arbaki, warlords or politicians, 
and relying on intimidation. (ibid)
The fieldwork in Kunduz found that in some cases, people have take action against corruption 
and abuse by Mirabs. The study recounts how in one district ‘people collaborated in preventing 
a corrupted Mirab from being nominated through his powerful connections, and struggled 
until they could fairly elect their own Mirab’ (Rassul 2012: 35).
The breakdown of water management institutions has given rise to ‘uneven distribution of 
water’, negatively affecting especially the downstream communities. The breakdown of the 
system has meant that ‘there are no checks on claims to water resources’. Water-related 
conflicts further divisions and antagonisms at the local level and negatively affect people’s 
livelihoods and well-being. As the field research brought out: this has motivated people to 
‘find alternative ways of organizing access to and resolve local conflicts over water. One 
such example found during the field study […] has been an increased use of informal justice 
institutions to manage and resolve water related issues’ (Rassul 2012: 29). The informal justice 
system is trusted and, in the eyes of people, provides ‘a viable alternative’ (Rassul 2012: 36). In 
some cases, people turn to the informal justice system as an alternative to the Mirab system 
which they no longer trust. In other cases, ‘the informal justice system is used as a means of 
further supporting the Mirab system and [to] enable it to withstand the pressure from various 
groups and power holders’ (Rassul 2012: 36). This testifies to the capacity of local societies to 
adapt informal institutions in view of new circumstances.
Emerging threats to non-state institutions
Both case studies emphasise how non-state institutions are dynamic and respond flexibly to 
changing circumstances. However, the studies also show some concern with current trends 
that might undermine the customary and informal institutions. A first concern relates to the 
social cohesion, that provides the basis to the effectiveness of non-state institutions. The 
Mirab system discussed above was found to be affected by local divisions. The Sanaag study 
expressed concern with a ‘multiplication’ of leaders as small sub-groups have elected their own 
traditional leaders, and the ‘weakening of community values and norms’  (SORADI 2011: 65).
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A second concern is with the institutions getting ‘corrupted’. The closer interaction with the 
state can be a risk factor in this regard. In Sanaag people were concerned about traditional 
leaders ‘getting too closely associated with the government and its politics’ (SORADI 2011: 
26). Some respondents argued that ‘traditional leaders were lured by the possibility of 
marshalling new forms of power from their close association with the State and its politics, 
since this means access to state resources and positions of power in the government. This is 
widely believed to have degraded the traditional authority system’ (SORADI 2011: 26).
This resembles what happens in Kunduz, where the support by the international community 
might pose a similar threat. Fieldwork found informal justice institutions are starting to 
be affected by corruption: ‘the increased engagement by the international community with 
jirgas/shuras in assistance delivery […] is bringing the financial factor into these institutions. 
Where traditionally the motivation for community elders and others who mediate between 






The studies cited in this report, on Afghanistan (Kunduz, Takhar) and Somaliland/Puntland 
(Sanaag) brought out very clearly that the state had a very limited reach. The governance of 
everyday life in the regions studied relied to an important extent on well-developed and firmly 
rooted customary and informal institutions. The studies thus confirmed the fact that people 
rely on home-grown institutions to address their everyday human security needs related 
to livelihood stress, resource management and competition, conflict and violence. The 
type of non-state institutions that were found to be relevant primarily included customary 
authorities, rooted in tradition, community-level  mechanisms for consultation and decision 
making, and emergent arrangements for addressing specific needs. With this, the findings 
mostly confirm the existing knowledge on customary institutions in fragile states.
Overall, the studies brought out that the home-grown institutions were viewed positively in 
the eyes of local populations. People perceived them as strong, effective and appropriate. 
This was not a given, however. The legitimacy of local level institutions derived from their 
performance in terms of responding to locally identified needs, familiarity, the fact that they 
were guided by locally accepted values (including equity), and that there were possibilities for 
constituencies to steer and hold leadership accountable. When specific institutions no longer 
meet these expectations, they may enter into decline, as was described for the Mirab system 
in the Afghanistan study. When given the opportunity, people will then look for alternatives, 
either by seeking to change the existing institution or by turning to an alternative institution.
In the regions studied, the state was both ‘absent’ and ‘present’. People mostly experienced 
the state as ‘missing’. Despite efforts at increasing state presence, the state was seen as 
distant and lacked the legitimacy of home-grown institutions. People had an idea of what 
a state would ideally provide for them, but experienced a state which in their daily lives, for 
all practical purposes, could not deliver. The state, however, was clearly present on people’s 
horizons and there were multiple references to the state as an idea, as the bigger whole of 
which people were part. Non-state institutions were depicted as ‘nested’ within that bigger 
polity. The analysis brought out that in exceptional situations that transcend local response 
mechanisms, such as the severe drought discussed for Sanaag, state agencies were turned to 
and did engage with the problem. This was one of the most surprising findings of the study: 
though people’s everyday lives reflected a situation of ‘governance without government’, 
they maintained an idea of the state as the ultimate fall-back option in responding to critical 
events. 
The studies make clear that the institutional landscape in the regions studied is multiple and, 
to some extent, hybrid. Next to the variety of home-grown institutions and the institutions 
of the state, other sets of institutions were: armed opposition groups (Afghanistan) and 
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civil society organisations and international NGOs (Somaliland/Puntland). The field 
studies shed light on what types of interactions occur in this multiple field. The interaction 
between customary/home-grown institutions and state institutions as brought out by the 
studies could best be described as one of functional complementarity or perhaps pragmatic 
accommodation. In response to problems such as drought or the control of crime and 
violence, a concerted strategy was worked out which sought to build on the respective 
strengths. The state was relied on, for example, for its greater capacity to enforce security, 
but customary authorities were needed to achieve acceptance of  de-escalation measures 
amongst the population. In the case of the drought in Sanaag, the regional government 
took on a coordinating role, in conjunction with humanitarian agencies, but implementation 
was organised through local arrangements. In these cases of complementarity, the power of 
initiative rested to an important degree with the customary authorities: they were the ones to 
decide to approach state agencies or other actors in search of specific problems.
A general concern relating to situations of institutional multiplicity or legal pluralism 
is with the confusion and overlap between different justice systems, and the risk of 
widespread forum shopping. Though the case reports make some mention of unclarity over 
competencies, this is not the main concern emphasised. To what extent hybrid systems 
evolve in which customary and state justice systems intertwine to such a degree that they 
cannot be easily distinguished from each other, could not be determined on the basis of the 
case studies. The impression is that the situation is rather one of an intricate, and evolving, 
division of labour between collaborating but distinct partners.
The studies showed that within these multiple institutional fields non-state institutions 
change and adapt, in response to new challenges and the needs and strategies of local 
populations. This suggests indeed that the active pursuit of human security shapes both how 
institutions develop and how they relate to each other.
Reflections on the research approach
The approach chosen in this research program was to follow real problems and how these 
were addressed by the institutions people turned to. Looking back, we have found this 
approach indeed fruitful to move beyond static and possibly idealised pictures of the nature 
of and relation between state and non-state institutions. At the same time, the initiators 
and academic facilitators of the program feel that the full potential of the approach has not 
been realised in the current studies, partly due to time constraints and because of possibly 
different expectations between them and the research teams who effectuated the studies. 
We consider that more in-depth analysis of specific cases followed in their trajectory through 
the institutional landscape and hence of institutions ‘at work’, would have increased the 
contribution of this research to the debates on local institutions in fragile states.
A limitation in the present study has been the lack of a diversity of viewpoints. The studies 
give a suggestion of a strong consensus on the importance, effectiveness and legitimacy of 
customary institutions, and the question is whether this consensus remains when a diversity 
of actors differentiated on the basis of gender, age, economic position, ethnicity or political 
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affiliation is interviewed. This would allow also for understanding how differences in power 
or interest shape people’s perception of institutions and institutional response. Following 
individual cases from different types of people would probably bring out a more variegated 
image in which it becomes clear that there are multiple answers to the questions ‘Who do 
people turn to?’ and ‘how do institutions work’, ‘for whom’ and ‘when’. This would help 
enormously in assessing whether customary institutions also work for women, to name but 
one of the potentially most controversial issues.
Implications for intervention9
This research program had the ambition to contribute to ‘fashioning intervention strategies 
that appropriately support human security and state building in fragile environments’ (de 
Regt et al, 2010: 2). Oxfam Novib is committed to building ‘its interventions on existing, and 
therefore sustainable arrangements’ (ibid: 23), an ambition that is now widely shared and 
often summarised under the heading of ‘working with what is there’ (Hilhorst et al 2010). 
What can we learn from the studies to inform policy?
The ambition to link with non-state institutions can be a fruitful entry point given the 
strength and importance of these institutions in many contexts. However, the ambition to 
work with what is there, requires carefully looking at what is there, both in terms of customary 
institutions and in terms of the role of the state. It can be problematic when international 
NGOs assume too soon that ‘there is no government’, in contexts where the state is a 
meaningful institution to people that complements the customary or informal in specific 
ways.
Following on the above: there is no need to make an ‘either-or’ choice between working with 
state or non-state institutions.  The existence of multiple institutions can rather be taken as 
a starting point and, for a particular context, it would need to be examined what works, how, 
and in what constellation with other institutions. To do that, agencies may follow a similar 
methodology as was followed for this research: that is, to follow where people go with their 
problems. The role of (international) NGOs could be to support effective institutions or 
arrangements, irrespective of their form or origin, as well as specific institutional trajectories 
and multi-institutional responses. This is in line with many agencies’ original intent to reduce 
people’s vulnerabilities and insecurity, and to seek and strengthen those institutions and 
arrangements that contribute to that.
Rights-based NGOs like Oxfam Novib can approach customary or other non-state 
institutions as ‘duty-bearers’ in the absence of a well-functioning state. This means these 
institutions can be engaged in dialogue on their duties towards their constituencies. 
A key challenge is to avoid undermining effective local institutions by supporting them 
financially or through molding them too strictly to non-local criteria. Providing external 
resources to locally legitimate institutions may compromise their local accountability and 
lead to tensions, as was shown in the case of the Mirab in Afghanistan. Rather, the way 
forward would seem to be in a double strategy of engaging with duty bearers (whether 
9 This section benefitted highly from the input of Anne Pieter van Dijk and Wim de Regt.
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customary, state, or otherwise) on their ideas and understandings of public responsibility 
and service, and with local populations in their claim-making towards these authorities. The 
strong sense that customary authorities are mandated from below, as encountered in the 
studies, creates room for dialogue on accountability and responsiveness.
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